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migration, which will be resisted as states reach their absorptive capacity.
Closed borders could aggravate the desperation and lead, as in the past, to
the development of bizarre ideologies and aggressive tendencies. There will
be no possibility of quarantine.
VII.
In some eschatologies, debate rages over whether there will be a need for
law of any sort after the arrival of the Messiah. The international political
system is at the threshold of a time of hope. The ending of the Cold War is a
major achievement, but we are not about to enter the millennium. "This
annus," as Auden said, "is not mirabilis." The need for international law
after the Cold War will be more urgent than it was during the conflict. In
many ways, what is expected of international law will be greater.
In a period of rapid change, no system of law can content itself with a
pious, mechanical replication of the past, for the future may be quite differ-
ent from the past. Replication may then be a formula, not for reachieving
what was gained in the past, but for disaster. The challenge to international
lawyers and scholars must be to clarify continuously the common interests of
this ever-changing community, drawing on historic policies but bearing in
mind that the constitutive and institutional arrangements that were devised
to achieve them may no longer be pertinent or effective.
W. MICHAEL REISMAN
SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
anachronism . . . 1: an error in chronology; esp: a chronological
misplacing of persons, events, objects or customs in regard to each
other. . . 2: a person or a thing that is chronologically out of place;
esp: one that belongs to a former age and is incongruous if found in
the present ....
Webster's Third International Diclionary
I.
Since Aristotle, the term "sovereignty" has had a long and varied history
during which it has been given different meanings, hues and tones, depend-
ing on the context and the objectives of those using the word.' Bodin and
Hobbes shaped the term to serve their perception of an urgent need for
internal order. Their conception influenced several centuries of interna-
tional politics and law2 and also became a convenient supplementary secular
'See [Installment] 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 397, 399 (R.
Bernhardt ed. 1989) (discussion of historical evolution of term "sovereignty" from Aristotle to
present).
2 Id. at 401-02.
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slogan for the various absolute monarchies of the time. Sovereignty often
came to be an attribute of a powerful individual, whose legitimacy over
territory (which was often described as his domain and even identified with
him) rested on a purportedly direct or delegated divine or historic authority
but certainly not, Hobbes's covenant of the multitude3 notwithstanding, on
the consent of the people.
The public law of Europe, the system of international law established by
the assorted monarchs of the continent to serve their common purposes,
reflected and reinforced this conception by insulating from legal scrutiny
and competence a broad category of events that were later enshrined as
"matters solely within the domestic jurisdiction." 4 If another political power
entered the territory of the sovereign (whatever the reason) without his
permission, his sovereignty was violated. In such matters, the sovereign's will
was the only one that was legally relevant.
With the words "We the People,"' the American Revolution inaugurated
the concept of the popular will as the theoretical and operational source of
political authority. On its heels, the French Revolution and the advent of
subsequent democratic governments confirmed the concept. Political legiti-
macy henceforth was to derive from popular support; governmental author-
ity was based on the consent of the people in the territory in which a govern-
ment purported to exercise power. At first only for those states in the van-
guard of modern politics, later for more and more states, the sovereignty of
the sovereign became the sovereignty of the people: popular sovereignty.
It took the formal international legal system time to register these pro-
found changes. Another century beset by imperialism, colonialism and fas-
cism was to pass, but by the end of the Second World War, popular sover-
eignty was firmly rooted as one of the fundamental postulates of political
legitimacy. Article 1 of the UN Charter established as one of the purposes of
the United Nations, to develop friendly relations between states, not on any
terms, but "based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-deter-
mination of peoples."
Any lingering doubt that use of the term "self-determination" might have
amounted to a mechanical, or at best a deferential, carry-over from Wilson-
ian diplomacy, and not a radical decision that henceforth the internal author-
ity of governments would be appraised internationally, was dispelled three
years later. In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a document then
describing itself as "a common standard of achievement" but now accepted
as declaratory of customary international law, Article 21(3) provided that
"[tihe will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government;
this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be
5 T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (M. Oakeshott ed. 1946).
' Under Article 15(8) of the Covenant of the League of Nations, if the Council found a
dispute between any two parties "to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely
within the domestic jurisdiction of that party," the Council would refrain from making any
rccommendation as to its settlement. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT Art. 15, para. 8,
htprmtad in 13 AJIL 128, 134 (Supp. 1919).
' U.S. CONST., Preamble.
1990]
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by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equiva-
lent free voting procedures." 6 Of course, there had been regional pacts
based upon similar notions,7 much as there had been holy alliances based on
their antithesis. The significance of this statement in the Universal Declara-
tion was that it was now expressed in a fundamental international constitutive
legal document. In international law, the sovereign had finally been
dethroned.
Unlike certain other grand statements of international law, the concept of
popular sovereignty was not to remain mere pious aspiration. The interna-
tional lawmaking system proceeded to prescribe criteria for appraising the
conformity of internal governance with international standards of democ-
racy.8 Thanks to a happy historical conjunction, modern communications
technology has made it possible to verify that conformity rapidly and eco-
nomically and to broadcast it widely. International and regional organiza-
tional monitors now use the new technology in critical national elections so
as to ensure that they are free and fair.9 The results of such elections serve as
evidence of popular sovereignty and become the basis for international en-
' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810, at 71
(1948).
7 See, e.g., Central American Treaty of Peace (Treaty of Washington), Additional Convention
to the General Treaty, Art. I, 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1907, at 696,
696, reprinted in 2 AJIL 229, 229-30 (Supp. 1908):
The Governments of the High Contracting Parties shall not recognize any other Govern-
ment which may come into power in any of the five Republics as a consequence of a coup
d'etat, or of a revolution against the recognized Government, so long as the freely elected
representatives of the people thereof have not constitutionally reorganized the country,
8 See, for example, United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, GA Res. 1904 (XVIII) (Nov. 20, 1963); International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 UNTS 195;
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, GA
Res. 3068 (XXVIII) (Nov. 30, 1973); Convention against Discrimination in Education, Dec.
14, 1960, 429 UNTS 32; Convention concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women
Workers for Work of Equal Value,June 29, 1951, 165 UNTS 303; Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, GA Res. 34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979); Declara-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief, GA Res. 36/55 (Nov. 25, 1981); Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory La-
bour, June 28, 1930, 39 UNTS 55; Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA
Res. 3452 (XXX) (Dec. 9, 1975); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA Res. 39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984); Code of Conduct for
Law Enforcement Officials, GA Res. 34/169 (Dec. 17, 1979); and Declaration of Basic Princi-
ples ofJustice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, GA Res. 40/34 (Nov. 29, 1985); as
well as the numerous conventions on social welfare, marriage and the family and cultural rights.
See also Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly During its 20th Session, 20 UN GAOR
Supp. (No. 14) at 53-65, UN Doc. A/6014 (1965) (series of resolutions adopted on non-self-
governing territories).
' For example, in the recently concluded Namibia elections, the ballot counting and tabula-
tion were overseen by 1,700 electoral supervisors, part of a United Nations Transition Assist-
ance Group (UNTAG). See UN CHRON., March 1990, at 42. Similarly, a UN observation
mission for the verification of elections in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) was set up there in December
1989 to observe and monitor the 1990 elections. Id. at 64.
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dorsement of the elected government.'" In functional terms, this process
constitutes a new type of inclusive international recognition. Decisions to
withhold recognition where the will of the people has been demonstrably
ignored or suppressed have increasingly led to the next stage, the institution
of international programs designed to permit or facilitate the realization of
the popular will."
Although the venerable term "sovereignty" continues to be used in inter-
national legal practice, its referent in modern international law is quite dif-
ferent. International law still protects sovereignty, but-not surprisingly-
it is the people's sovereignty rather than the sovereign's sovereignty. Under
the old concept, even scrutiny of international human rights without the
permission of the sovereign could arguably constitute a violation of sover-
eignty by its "invasion" of the sovereign's domaine rgservi. The United Na-
tions Charter replicates the "domestic jurisdiction-international concern"
dichotomy, but no serious scholar still supports the contention that internal
human rights are "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state"
and hence insulated from international law.
This contemporary change in content of the term "sovereignty" also
changes the cast of characters who can violate that sovereignty. Of course,
'0 After the November 1989 elections in Namibia, the UN Security Council congratulated
the people of Namibia and affirmed the election results; the Special Committee on Decoloniza-
tion declared on December 4 that the Namibian elections had been held "in conformity with
established UN standards of decolonization"; and Special Representative Ahtisaari declared
that the electoral process had "at each stage been free and fair." See id. at 41-43.
" After Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965, the international commu-
nit)' overwhelmingly denounced the action and refused to recognize Rhodesia as one inde-
pendent state. See generally The Situation in Southern Rhodesia: Resolutions Adopted by the General
AsneblyN and the Security Council of the United Nations, reprinted in 60 AJIL 921 (1966). For
commentary, see McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness ofInter-
natlmal Concern, 62 AJIL 1 (1968).
With respect to Namibia, the United Nations consistently refused to recognize South Africa's
occupation of Namibia. See, e.g., Marn-Bosch, How Nations Vote in the General Assembly of the
Umted Nations, 41 INT'L ORG. 705, 705-06 (1987) (pointing out that Namibia was the subject
of more resolutions than all other past decolonization issues combined). Indeed, by Resolution
2145 (XXI) of October 27, 1966, the General Assembly placed Namibia under the direct
responsibility of the United Nations so as to enable Namibians to exercise their right of self-de-
termination. It also established the UN Council for Namibia (by Resolution 2248 (S-V) of May
19, 1967) with the objective, inter alia, of obtaining the withdrawal of South Africa from
Namibia. Se Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia, 39 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 24)
at 1, U N Doc. A/39/24 (1984). Other international programs eventually led to the independ-
ence of Namibia on March 21, 1990.
The South African situation has also gained the attention of the international community in
the past few decades. See, e.g., the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of
South Africa, GA Res. 3151 (XXVIII), 28 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 33, UN Doc. A/9030
(1973); GA Res. 39/72, 39 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 40, UN Doc. A/39/51 (1985);
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, GA
Res. 3068 (XXVIII), 28 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 30), supra, at 75. Talks are currently under way
to work out a form of representative government for a future South Africa. See Waldmeir, ANC
May End Armed Struggle, Fin. Times (London), May 5, 1990, at 1, col. 7.
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popular sovereignty is violated when an outside force invades and imposes its
will on the people. One thinks of the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 or of
Kuwait in 1990.2 But what happens to sovereignty, in its modern sense,
when it is not an outsider but some home-grown specialist in violence who
seizes and purports to wield the authority of the government against the
wishes of the people, by naked power, by putsch or by coup, by the usurpa-
tion of an election or by those systematic corruptions of the electoralprocess
in which almost 100 percent of the electorate purportedly votes for the
incumbent's list (often the only choice)? Is such a seizer of power entitled to
invoke the international legal term "national sovereignty" to establish or
reinforce his own position in international politics?
Under the old international law, the internal usurper was so entitled, for
the standard was de facto control: the only test was the effective power of the
claimant. In the Tinoco case,"3 Costa Rica sought to defend itself by claiming
a violation of its popular sovereignty. Tinoco, the erstwhile Minister of War,
had seized power in violation of the Constitution. Therefore, the subsequent
restorationist Costa Rican Government contended, his actions could not be
deemed to have bound Costa Rica. But Chief Justice Taft decided that by
virtue of his effective control, Tinoco had represented the legitimate govern-
ment as long as he enjoyed that control.
The Tinoco decision was consistent with the law of its time. Were it applied
strictly now, it would be anachronistic, for it stands in stark contradiction to
the new constitutive, human rights-based conception of popular sovereignty.
To be sure, there were policy reasons for Tinoco, which may still have some
cogency, but the important point is that there was then no countervailing
constitutive policy of international human rights and its conception of popu-
lar sovereignty.
Caudillos and their like appear to be susceptible to a megalomania that
identifies their corporeal selves with the symbols of the nation and the state.
They invoke a "'sovereignty' so grandiose and capricious. . . it might be
supposed to be a deliberate caricature, save for the intensity of the senti-
ments that are mobilized around the symbol itself." 4 Happily, the interna-
tional legal system in which declamations such as "l'6tat, c'est moi" were
coherent has long since been consigned to history's scrap heap. In our era,
such pronouncements become, at least for audiences at a safe remove, the
stuff of refined comedy. They would be occasions for general hilarity, even
in the countries where they are still staged, were it not for the endless misery
that the dictators who grant themselves sovereignty always inflict upon the
human beings trapped within the boundaries of the territory the dictators
have confused with themselves.
,S On the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and the applicable norms of armed
conflict, see generally Reisman & Silk, Which Low Applies to the Afghan ConflictP, 82 AJIL 459
(1988).
"s Tinoco case (Great Brit. v. Costa Rica), 1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 369 (1923), reprinted in 18
AJIL 147 (1924).
14 McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, in
M. S. McDOUGAL & W. M. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS 197 (1981).
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'II.
In many countries, the internal political situation is murky and constitu-
tional procedures for the orderly transfer of power are nonexistent or inef-
fective. In a flurry of coups and putsches, both outsiders and insiders may be
unable to ascertain the popular will, especially if the disorder or tyranny has
prevented it from being consulted or expressed. Even in the absence of
elections-indeed, even when there are "supervised" elections-'it is often
clear that the vast majority of the people detest those who have assumed
power and characterize themselves as the government. It is more difficult,
however, to say who the people would wish in their stead. They may not
know, which is one of the reasons that international legal supervision of
elections is designed to include an adequate period for candidacies to be
developed and to allow campaigning, so that voters can make the informed
choice that is at the center of free and fair elections.
But in circumstances in which free elections are internationally supervised
and the results are internationally endorsed as free and fair and the people's
choice is clear, the world community does not need to speculate on what
constitutes popular sovereignty in that country.
When those confirmed wishes are ignored by a local caudillo who either
takes power himself or assigns it to a subordinate he controls, a jurist rooted
in the late twentieth century can hardly say that an invasion by outside forces
to remove the caudillo and install the elected government is a violation of
national sovereignty. Cross-border military actions should certainly never be
extolled, for they are necessarily brutal and destructive of life and property.
They may well be unlawful for a variety of other reasons. But if they displace
the usurper and emplace the people who were freely elected, they can be
characterized, in this particular regard, as a violation of sovereignty only if
one uses the term anachronistically to mean the violation of some mystical
survival of a monarchical right that supposedly devolves jure gentium on
whichever warlord seizes and holds the presidential palace or if the term is
used in the jurisprudentially bizarre sense to mean that inanimate territory
has political rights that preempt those of its inhabitants."5
This is not to say that every externally motivated action to remove an
unpopular government is now permitted, or that officer corps that feel obso-
lescence hard upon them can claim a new raison d'tre and start scouring the
globe for opportunities for "democratizing" interventions. Authoritative
conclusions about the lawfulness of the unilateral use of force, no less than
about an), other unilateral action, turn on many contextual factors: e.g., the
contingencies allegedly justifying the unilateral use, the availability of feasi-
ble persuasive alternatives, the means of coercion selected, the level of coer-
cion used (the classic test of necessity and proportionality), whether the ob-
'" Sre Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL.
L. REv. 450 (1972); Tribe, Ways Not to Think about Plastic Trees: New FoundationsforEnvironmen-
tal Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974). For a cogent critique on this point, cf. Schwartz, The Rights of
Xature and the Death of God, PUB. INTEREST, No. 97, 1989, at 3.
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jectives of the intervener include internationally illicit aims, the aggregate
consequences of inaction, and the aggregate consequences of action.16 But it
is to say that the suppression of popular sovereignty may be a justifying
factor, not ajustification per se but a conditio sine qua non. And it is to say that
the word "sovereignty" can no longer be used to shield the actual suppres-
sion of popular sovereignty from external rebuke and remedy.
International law is still concerned with the protection of sovereignty, but,
in its modern sense, the object of protection is not the power base of the
tyrant who rules directly by naked power or through the apparatus of a
totalitarian political order, but the continuing capacity of a population freely
to express and effect choices about the identities and policies of its gover-
nors. In modern international law, the "unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence" by the Smith Government in Rhodesia was not an exercise of
national sovereignty but a violation of the sovereignty of the people of Zim-
babwe. 7 The Chinese Government's massacre in Tiananmen Square to
maintain an oligarchy against the wishes of the people was a violation of
Chinese sovereignty. The Ceausescu dictatorship was a violation of Roma-
nian sovereignty. President Marcos violated Philippine sovereignty, General
Noriega violated Panamanian sovereignty, and the Soviet blockade of
Lithuania violated its sovereignty. Fidel Castro violates Cuban sovereignty
by mock elections that insult the people whose fundamental human rights
are being denied, no less than the intelligence of the rest of the human race.
In each case, the violators often brazenly characterize the international com-
munity's condemnation as itself a violation of their sovereignty. Sadly, some
organizations and some scholars, falling victim to anachronism, have given
them comfort.
In modern international law, sovereignty can be violated as effectively and
ruthlessly by an indigenous as by an outside force, in much the same way that
the wealth and natural resources of a country can be spoliated as thoroughly
and efficiently by a native as by a foreigner. I" Sovereignty can be liberated as
much by an indigenous as by an outside force. As in the interpretation of any
other event in terms of policy, context and consequence must be considered.
IV.
The international human rights program is more than a piecemeal addi-
tion to the traditional corpus of international law, more than another
chapter sandwiched into traditional textbooks of international law. By shift-
ing the fulcrum of the system from the protection of sovereigns to the pro-
tection of people, it works qualitative changes in virtually every component.
Many of the old terms survive, but in using them in a modern context, one
should bear in mind Holmes's lapidary dictum: "A word is not a crystal,
16 See M. S. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, Cli.
(1961).
17 See supra note 11.
18 See Reisman, Harnessinglnhtenzational Law to Restrain and Recapture hdigenous Spoliations, 83
AJIL 56 (1989).
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transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary
greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in
which it is used." 19
When constitutive changes such as these are introduced into a legal system
while many other struts of the system are left in place, appliers and inter-
preters of current cases cannot proceed in a piecemeal and mechanical fash-
ion. Precisely because the human rights norms are constitutive, other norms
must be reinterpreted in their light, lest anachronisms be produced. This
process of "updating" or "contemporization" or actualisation, as French
scholars call it, is not unknown to international law. In the South-West Africa
opinion,"° the International Court indicated the absurdity of mechanically
applying an old norm without reference'to fundamental constitutive
changes, and national courts have often expressed the need and authority to
actualize.2 ' The same style of actualization is required with regard to the
assessment of the lawfulness of human rights actions. When this is not done,
legal arguments and judgments will be marked by anachronism.
In the debate over the U.S. action in Panama in the United Nations, the
Nicaraguan Permanent Representative, whose Government had requested
the meeting, opened it by proclaiming: "Once again an offence has been
committed against our peoples. Once again an attempt is being made to
make brute force appear to be law. Once again the principles which are the
foundation of international relations have been violated." 2 2 The Permanent
Representative proceeded to cite, chapter and verse, the United Nations
Charter and the OAS Charter to establish "[t]his flagrant violation of
Panama's sovereignty and territorial integrity." 23 No reference whatsoever
was made to Manuel Antonio Noriega's suppression of popular sovereignty,
or to the fact that both the internationally supervised election before the
military action and the opinion polls after it indicated overwhelming support
for the change that was realized.24 These issues were swept away by indirec-
tion, when the Permanent Representative said that "no argument can possi-
bly justify intervention against a sovereign state." 25
'9 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 372, 376 (1918).
South-West Africa-Voting Procedure, 1955 ICJ REP. 67, 77 (Advisory Opinion of
June 7).
M' . S. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, ch. 4 (1967).
22 UN Doc. S/PV.2899, at 3-5 (Dec. 20, 1989). I treat this statement as made in good faith.
It is not inappropriate to note, however, that those who invoke this argument frequently re-
sterve for their governments a right of intervention for various revolutionary purposes, e.g.,
ways of national liberation. See, in this regard, Reisman, Old Wine in New Bottles: The Reagan and
Br, zliwnv Dctinm's in Contemporar 'International Law and Practice, 13 YALEJ. INT'L L. 171 (1988).
"' UN Doc. S/PV.2899, supra note 22, at 4.
A One of the more ironic aspects of the Panama affair was that all indications before and after
the U.S. invasion were that while the vast majority of the Panamanian people viewed it as a
liberation, the other governments of the region voted in the OAS to condemn it as a violation of
Panamanian sovereignty. According to most news reports, the U.S. military action in Panama
was met with overwhelming approval by the Panamanian people. See, e.g., After Noriega, ECONO-
MIST, Jan. 16, 1990, at 37.
UN Doc. S/PV.2902, at 7 (Dec. 23, 1989).
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This is what Professor D'Amato, in his remarkable article, has called "the
rhetoric of statism." 26 The anachronism here is effected by the selective use
of the language of international law, carefully screening out everything that
has been introduced by the human rights movement. It may be contrasted
with the remark of Thomas Pickering, the United States Permanent Repre-
sentative, that "the people, not governments, are sovereign." 27 That formu-
lation, in turn, oversimplifies the decision calculus now required, for, as
expressed, it could make that single variable determinative of lawfulness in
all future cases. But at least it expresses the critical new constitutive policy in
international law, which is completely absent from the Nicaraguan formula.
Under the Nicaraguan version, sovereignty is not international protection
of the will of the people, but international protection for a group that calls
itself the government against the wishes of the people. There is no interna-
tional test of the legitimacy of a self-proclaimed government. The only test is
internal naked power. Under this version, Panama's sovereignty is violated
by the removal of the usurper and the establishment of conditions for the
assumption of power by the legitimate government. That is an anachronism.
Anachronism can only be avoided in legal decision by systematic actualiza-
tion, which considers inherited norms in the context of changed constitutive
normative systems and makes sensitive assessments of the relative weight
each is to be given and the various intensities with which each is demanded.
V.
The consequences of these changes are far-reaching. Some are clearly
beneficial to the new values of the international system. Some hold the po-
tential for destabilizing the system. On the credit side, international human
rights puts current and erstwhile tyrants on notice that monarchical and
elitist conceptions of national sovereignty cannot be invoked to immunize
them from the writ of international law. Some have already grasped the
implications of this development. Haiti, in July 1990, asked the United
Nations to provide three hundred civilian officials to supervise its upcoming
elections and forty military officers to ensure that the local armed forces
would be part of the solution rather than part of the problem.2" Haiti's
provisional Foreign Minister, Kesler Clermont, said such a team would set "a
powerful precedent" for UN monitoring of Third World elections "to cer-
tify their legitimacy." 29 Three of the seven Third World members of the
Security Council opposed the request."0 The princes may not like this, but
for peoples languishing under despotism and dictatorship, the development
promises, at least, the condemnation by international law of the violation of
their sovereignty and the possibility, uncertain as it may be, of a remedy.
26 D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lauful Response to Tyranny, 84 AJIL 516, 518
(1990).
27 UN Doc. S/PV.2902, supra note 25, at 8.
28 Lewis, Haiti Wants U.N. to Monitor Vote, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1990, at 10, col. 6.
29 Id. 30 Id.
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On the debit side, while the bite of human rights norms is extended, so,
too, is systemic instability. In decentralized systems whose members them-
selves perforce make the decisions, the more the number of constitutive
appraisal norms, the more the number of cross-border appraisals and the
greater the possibility of cross-border meddling by various actors. The prob-
lem is contained, to an extent, when internationally supervised "free and
fair" elections credibly and unequivocally indicate the wishes of a majority of
the people. It is also contained when other nonelectoral indicators show the
popular will, though without the clarity and freedom vouchsafed by secret
ballot. When popular wishes are usurped violently, the confirmed expres-
sion of popular sovereignty tells everyone who the real usurper is and who
should rightfully constitute the government, no matter how convincing the
newspeak of the dictator's apparatus may be.
Unambiguous situations, however, may be exceptions. When the interna-
tionally supervised elections result in an absence of consensus on who should
govern, or the integrity of the elections is doubtful, or there have been no
elections, or a civil insurrection has left diverse groups vying for power, no
one can be sure that the unilateral intervener from the outside is implement-
ing popular wishes. To varying extents, the intervener will be shaping them.
In some circumstances, the banner of popular sovereignty can become a fig
leaf for its suppression by foreign intervention, especially when governments
bent on intervention maintain stables of alternative local leaders who can be
brought forward to authorize an invasion at the appropriate time."1 In prac-
tice, therefore, there may be a factual "gray" area between unequivocal
expressions of popular will through internationally supervised, observed or
validated elections, on the one hand, and the atrocities that warrant humani-
tarian intervention, on the other. Situations falling into the gray area will
simply not lend themselves to unilateral action.
The most satisfactory solution to this problem is the creation of central-
ized institutions, equipped with decision-making authority and the capacity
to make it effective. But in the immediate future, that solution remains
unlikely, and to make it a condition of lawful decision now only evades
addressing the policies that the notion of popular sovereignty encapsulates.
The given of contemporary international decision making is the absence of
such institutions and the need to focus on regulating unilateral decision
making. Because rights without remedies are not rights at all, prohibiting the
unilateral vindication of clear violations of rights when multilateral possibili-
ties do not obtain is virtually to terminate those rights.
It is no longer politically feasible or morally acceptable to suspend the
operation of human rights norms until every constitutive problem is solved.
In the interim, new criteria for unilateral human rights actions must be
established. In addition, more refined techniques for their legal appraisal
and more effective means for their condemnation when such actions are
themselves unlawful must be developed. One contribution of our profession
" See, e.g., Reisman & Silk, supra note 12, at 466-79 (discussion of factual situation in
Afghanistan leading to "invitation" of Soviet armed forces by Afghan "government").
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should be to develop methods for assessing popular will and makingjudg-
ments about divergences.
The violation of sovereignty has heretofore largely been treated with pas-
sive strategies: absorbing those who have been obliged to flee their own
countries. With the increasing refinement of transportation, domestic hu-
man rights pathologies now generate larger and larger numbers of refugees.
But the welfare democracies of the world, which are the preferred refuge of
those fleeing human rights violations in their own countries, have begun to
reach the limits of their absorptive capacities. The passive strategy of dealing
with violations of sovereignty will no longer work. An active strategy that
addresses the pathology itself is required, both pragmatically and by the very
conception of modern sovereignty.
VI.
Because human rights considerations introduce so many more variables
into the determination of lawfulness, an even heavier burden of deliberation
devolves upon international lawyers in assessing the lawfulness of actions.
Matters become more complex and uncertain than they were in an interna-
tional legal system that was composed of a few binary rules applied to a
checkerboard of monarchical states and, most particularly, that lacked an
international code of human rights. One can no longer simply condemn
externally motivated actions aimed at removing an unpopular government
and permitting the consultation or implementation of the popular will as per
se violations of sovereignty without inquiring whether and under what con-
ditions that will was being suppressed, and how the external action will affect
the expression and implementation of popular sovereignty. The identifica-
tion of what is clearly "externally motivated action" is itself an increasingly
difficult task.
No one is entitled to complain that things are getting too complicated. If
complexity of decision is the price for increased human dignity on the
planet, it is worth it. Those who yearn for "the good old days" and continue
to trumpet terms like "sovereignty" without relating them to the human
rights conditions within the states under discussion do more than commit an
anachronism. They undermine human rights.
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